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Abstract 
 
 
Concerns about biosecurity in the food system raise a variety of issues about how the 
system is presently organized, why it might be vulnerable, what one could 
reasonably do to better secure it, and the costs of doing so. After presenting some 
facts about US agriculture and food, this paper considers three economic aspects of 
the general problem. One is the global problem, or the way biosecurity measures can 
affect how countries relate to each other and the global consequences that result. 
Another is how to best manage the immediate aftermath of a realized threat in order 
to minimize damage. The third is how to seek to prevent realization of the threat. 
Some policy alternatives are also presented. 
 
Keywords:  agro-terrorism, animal disease, biosecurity, epidemic, food system 
policy.  
 
 
Economic Aspects of Agricultural and Food Biosecurity 
 
1.  Introduction 
The economic dimensions of agricultural and food biosecurity cannot be ignored and go far 
beyond loss estimation. According to the online dictionary Encarta®, Biosecurity is “the 
protection of the economy, environment, and health of living things from diseases, pests, and 
bioterrorism.” Robbins (1935) defined economics as the inquiry into “choices made by 
individuals and societies concerning alternative uses of scarce resources employed to satisfy 
unlimited wants.” Efforts to provide security, be they in supporting a biological immune system, 
a state’s standing army, or the perimeters of one’s business operations, inevitably consume 
scarce resources.  
To those with malevolent intent, the food system is a plum prize. It is biological, offering 
opportunities to trick the target into growing the noxious agent. Food is consumed, providing a 
direct delivery mechanism. Food has cultural resonance in that it helps to define a society and is 
usually consumed in the seeming security of one’s own home. A significant failure in the food 
system can undermine a population’s confidence in its government and institutions in ways few 
others can. In addition, the food system is in some ways particularly vulnerable to natural 
breakdown and deliberate attack. Others have elaborated on this (see Kimball, 2006), and I will 
mention vulnerabilities only when relevant to other discussions.  
In at least one relevant sense, Robbins’s definition is insufficiently articulate and this is 
especially so when the matter is biosecurity. Biosecurity is provided at many levels, and 
decisions are made with diverse objectives in mind. Centralized decision-making on biosecurity 
in agriculture, a very decentralized sector, is not possible. Any endeavor to understand and 
encourage appropriate biosecurity choices must address these divergent incentives. Consider a 
government with the welfare of all consumers in mind, and also a producer who wishes to 
market products people want to consume. The government would generally find it best to leave 
the market alone. This is because consumers are best positioned to choose what they want, and 
for how much, while producers are best positioned to decide on what to make, and for how 
much. Sometimes, though, consumers may not know what they are getting because 
unwholesome food may not be readily apparent to consumers at the point of trade. Indeed, 
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producers may not know the true attributes of their produce. The government may have to act by 
monitoring quality or mandating actions.  
Furthermore, the objectives of different governments need not be consistent when it comes 
to biosecurity. Regions differ in regard to endemic diseases and pests. Consumers differ in 
strength of demand for food quality and safety. Societies differ in perceived vulnerabilities. In 
addition, exporting countries may view certain importer biosecurity requirements as trade 
protectionism. The objectives of different producers may also differ. Activities on a farm have 
biosecurity consequences for other farms. Infectious diseases spread spatially from farms where 
misfortune and/or lapses in defense have allowed entry. A farm may have insufficient incentive 
to incur a cost it bears in full in order to provide a benefit it shares only in part. Thus, the 
government may seek to, as best it can, promote biosecurity.  
And finally there is the terrorist. The rationale for such activities may be to create a sense of 
insecurity to the extent that the targeted institution cannot function as intended. Reconciling 
biosecurity incentives between some different parties may be feasible because appropriate 
measures can guide one party to take account of the consequences of its actions for others. In the 
case of terrorism, any reconciliation is unlikely. Resolution to thwart the terrorist does not, 
however, obviate the need to minimize the expected cost of damage. 
The remainder of this paper has five main parts. The first provides some facts about US food 
production, and about what economics can say concerning losses from biosecurity problems. The 
second deals with reassessing how open the country is to the outside. Any such reassessment 
inevitably exposes for debate and legislation contentious issues concerning trade, immigration, 
and personal freedom. In the third main part, aspects of response strategies in the event of a 
threat realization are considered. The next section steps back to ask what could be done to 
prevent the crisis. The final part presents some policy suggestions. 
 
2.  Some Facts, and a Disclaimer 
While on-farm agriculture, viewed narrowly, accounted for about 1% of US GDP in 2005, 
the share of US GDP spent on food was 8.2% in that year. Agriculture in the EU-25 accounts for 
about 1.6% of GDP while the share of GDP spent on food and non-alcoholic beverages is about 
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13%.1 This section discusses production, trade, and what economics can say about various costs 
arising due to biosecurity endeavors and biosecurity failures. 
2.1  Production and Trade 
Table 1 lists market receipts for the main US farm commodities, while Table 2 lists revenues 
from some of the main exports. The United States, being a large geographic area, is more diverse 
in its agricultural outputs than most countries. Farm-level receipts when averaged over the US 
population amount to about $790/person. Table 1 shows that crops and livestock account for 
approximately equal revenue shares, but livestock enterprises occupy the first three rankings and 
bovines account for 31.8% of receipts.  
The commodities listed in these tables pose some apparent biosecurity apprehensions. In 
recent years, costly commingling problems have occurred with genetically modified corn and 
rice. Corn, soybeans, and wheat enter a large variety of products so that product recalls would be 
expensive. A successful attack on an exported commodity may result in foreclosed world 
markets, causing large losses. An attack on an imported commodity when being produced can 
circumvent internal safeguards on production activities. For orchard crops, an attack would 
eliminate capital assets, involve orchard pull-up costs, and disrupt markets for several years. 
These crops tend to be geographically concentrated, so the spread of a disease may more readily 
occur. Threats to Napa Valley wine might readily catch headline attention and could have 
repercussions for tourism.  
On the whole, animals seem to be more vulnerable targets, if only because the produce 
affected move, are more valuable, and can be more difficult to clear of disease. Destroying a 
large number of animals is emotionally stressful for all concerned. In addition, indoor production 
in large scale allows for rapid spread of an infectious agent within a given herd. 
2.2.  Estimating Losses 
A proper accounting for economic losses to an economy from endemic animal and crop 
diseases is difficult because one has, for example, to include prevention costs. Estimates in 
Harvey (2001) suggest product-level costs of lost production of 14% for hogs, 11% for milk, 9% 
for beef, and 8% for sheep if foot and mouth disease (FMD) became endemic in the United 
                                                 
1 GDP, product sales, and other commonly used measures of economic contributions are not 
good measures of true contribution. Water and air are essential for life but make small 
contributions to the GDP measure. Data for better measures are generally too costly to obtain. 
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Kingdom. The cost to the United States of endemic animal-disease-related losses has been 
estimated at $17.5 billion per year (National Academies, 2005), about 18.2% of the $96 billion 
estimated value of livestock in 2005. Losses in less developed countries are likely much larger as 
a percentage of lost animal production. These estimates should be regarded as highly speculative 
because the reference point of production absent the disease is not well-defined. For example, 
productivity compromises can be made when breeding animals and plants in order to protect 
against diseases.  
Possible losses due to an inadvertent or deliberate introduction of an animal or crop disease 
are even more difficult to measure. Market disruptions, including whether the disruptions are 
temporary, are an issue. There will also be transfers in economic welfare because consumers will 
demand other foods instead, bidding prices up. In addition, such events are so infrequent and so 
distinctive that the capacity of the system to cope can never be known with high confidence. 
Indefinite loss of access to international markets is likely to be a more significant issue. Welfare 
losses to an exporting country can be large because market access can be denied long after the 
technical problem at issue should have been considered resolved. The destruction of valuable 
genetic stock is another issue, as is the possibility of human deaths. Human mortality carries with 
it distinctive loss evaluation problems (Ashenfelter, 2006). Health impairments, lost days at 
work, and stress-related accidents are other concerns that economists could place losses on if the 
extent of such occurrences were provided to them. 
There is also the issue of carcass disposal if control involves slaughter. With FMD, Jin, 
Huang, and McCarl (2005) compare a strategy of vaccination for later slaughter with one of 
immediate slaughter and immediate disposal. The vaccinate-and-hold approach may be more 
efficient when it is costly to dispose at short notice. In any case, any slaughter program could 
pose daunting logistical problems. Iowa does not intend to burn carcasses because of air quality 
concerns while burial poses water quality problems. Preventive costs cannot be ignored either. 
Identity preservation as a preventive measure can be very costly. Identity preservation also 
illustrates a complication in loss estimation. It protects against accidental and deliberate 
commingling and allows for information-related market premia in differentiated product 
markets. So attribution of costs across different motives for use would be challenging.  
A further problem is that little is known about country vulnerabilities to a biosecurity failure. 
This is so for failures that are natural in origin, and particularly so for any terrorism-related 
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failure. In addition, if terrorist goals are to create and manipulate uncertainties, then ascribing 
probabilities to different events is an almost insurmountably difficult task. So economists can 
make a stab at quantifying losses when the physical realities (extent and location of outbreak, 
human effects, etc.) of an event are presented to them. But they also need probability 
assessments of different physical realities if they are to assist in preventing and preparing for a 
failure. To work best, economists need to interact with epidemiologists so that the economic 
consequences of strategies engaged in at the field level are compared before these strategies are 
taken.  
Table 3 presents and comments on some of the many losses that can arise. The set of subject 
parties is not intended to be complete. Column 2 denotes ex ante, or preventive, costs as well as 
ex post costs. A subjective assessment of how capable economic tools are at measuring the loss 
is also provided. The word “maybe” often refers to unresolved issues in the use of such tools as 
survey instruments and economic experiments. In general, the estimation procedure takes time 
but back-of-the-envelope assessments can sometimes be provided with some confidence. An 
important item when reading the table is that the costs of preventing and dealing with natural 
pathogen attacks are unavoidable given the state of the world. But the additional costs of dealing 
with intentional attack are not a complete loss to society. Some of the extra resources interact 
beneficially with resources allocated to addressing natural pathogen attack. For example, 
additional veterinary resources put in place to diagnose a deliberate attack from an unspecified 
agent are also available to diagnose a natural outbreak.  
Assessing vulnerabilities and measuring losses allow for informed choices among practically 
grounded approaches to remedies. Among these decisions, biosecurity problems often concern 
the country’s boundaries so that many decisions have international dimensions. 
 
3.  Global Problems 
In this section I consider two themes regarding these international dimensions. One is that 
biosecurity is often what is referred to as a public good. At the country level of analysis, this 
means that the good is best provided at the global level. The other theme is that of trade, which 
can be adversely affected by biosecurity measures.  
3.1.  Public Goods 
A public good is one that can be used by more than one consumer without unduly 
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compromising its utility to other consumers. A food item is not a public good whereas a road is. 
Many goods that provide security are public in nature; a police force seeks to secure all citizens 
and property in a town. At the international level, biosecurity may be considered to be a public 
good. If a communicable diseases problem is eliminated in some country, then all other countries 
gain in this globalized age. To some extent, security from terrorism is also an international public 
good, as many terrorists target multiple countries.  
Through some of its units, the United Nations seeks to control infectious animal diseases at 
the transnational level. Separately, the World Organization for Animal Health (or OIE) is 
dedicated to addressing public goods aspects of global animal disease problems. For many low- 
and middle-income countries, animal agriculture is comparatively important; very limited 
veterinary resources are available, while national governance structures are often weak and 
unstable. OIE efforts include information transfer, coordination activities, and endeavors to 
provide continuity in animal disease management efforts. These and related infrastructure may 
assume greater importance in the years to come if regulations and labor costs cause animal 
production to exit developed countries. 
Is it wasteful for several transnational entities to address infectious agricultural disease 
problems in less developed countries? Probably not. These entities often have different goals and 
approaches. Developed and developing countries differ in ways that matter for the spread of 
infectious disease. Apart from contrasting healthcare infrastructure and production practices, the 
climate tends to be more temperate and fewer wildlife reservoirs remain in developed countries. 
Diseases that concern developed countries are not necessarily those most damaging to 
developing countries. A single entity trying to meet all the goals of recipient and donor countries 
might devote too much energy to reconciling conflicting objectives.  
3.2.  International Trade 
Food export markets are important for many countries, including some that are developed 
and heavily urban. Huang (2000), Thompson et al. (2002), Blake, Sinclair, and Sugiyarto (2003), 
Breeze (2004), and Blayney, Dyck, and Harvey (2006) provide perspectives on how FMD has 
affected production in Taiwan and the United Kingdom over the past decade. Why is such 
emphasis placed on maintaining access to international markets? The theory of comparative 
advantage is the idea that two parties (be they individuals or countries) can benefit from trading 
goods even if one party has an absolute advantage in producing both goods. Trade allows for 
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gains from specialization in our diverse capabilities, and comparative advantage determines the 
direction of trade. Beyond that, there is a belief that trade (and migration) are associated with 
technology transfer.  
The theory comes, however, with important qualifications. Among these is the absence of 
what are known as negative externalities. These are costs that someone imposes on someone 
else, i.e., people do not bear all consequences of their actions. Infectious disease and incomplete 
information on product safety are classic illustrations of a negative externality, and so there can 
be grounds for placing trade restrictions. There can also be grounds for better preparing countries 
for some adverse consequences of increasing openness, and many are concerned that this is not 
happening (Kimball, 2006). While a country as a whole may gain from trade, some interest 
groups may lose. The possibility of trade restrictions due to concerns about infectious animal and 
plant disease, therefore, provides groups with an opportunity to renegotiate a market 
environment. Although the politics are often appealing, the economic consequences of 
widespread renegotiations of this sort would likely be very negative in the long run.  
In summary, endeavors to address vulnerabilities at the border provide strong international 
dimensions to biosecurity problems. Possible responses include tackling problems at their 
source, trying to restrict movements of goods and people, or monitoring borders for suspicious 
traffic. It is the preponderant view among economists that potential losses would have to be very 
large before tight restrictions on the movements of goods and people would be the most 
appropriate action. 
 
4.  Responses 
Rapid mobilization of resources during a crisis can be challenging for a free society. Often, 
resources have to be coaxed free while urgent decisions must be made about trade-offs between 
individual rights and the public good. In the case of animal and crop diseases outbreaks, the 
sacrifices to be made may jeopardize a business’s capacity to survive. In addition, the growing 
share of non-farmers in a community will be asked to forbear for a sector that has developed 
image problems of various hues. This section deals with some issues on response in crisis that 
are distinctive to rural locations and agricultural/food markets. 
4.1.  Leadership 
No matter how much control a government attempts to assume during a crisis, people often 
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quietly ignore edicts whenever a government does not have the information and resources to 
compel (O’Toole, Mair, and Inglesby, 2002). To some extent, trust and sustained cooperation 
originate in the incentives people feel they countenance. Individuals will be best disposed to 
behave as desired if they believe leaders have few incentives to mislead and if they know others 
face comparable sacrifices. Leaders need to engender and convey the spirit of common sacrifice.  
But leadership goes far beyond that. It is sometimes the case that (a) two interacting 
individuals act such that both are happy with their actions given the behavior of the other party, 
but (b) neither should be happy with the overall outcome. For example, everyone might agree 
that travel be curtailed during an FMD outbreak, but everyone also hopes that others will curtail. 
Leadership often involves cajoling people to see that what is in the public interest is also in one’s 
private best interest, i.e., leadership has a coordination function. Rural areas, often with more 
clearly defined civic leadership structures, can be well-suited in some ways to meeting the public 
interest when great needs arise. 
Timeliness is another facet of leadership’s coordinating role, as what are the right decisions 
may depend on promptness in decision-taking. Almost inevitably, a significant biosecurity 
failure will involve a novel context. Cold-eyed attention is warranted when evaluating an 
institution’s structural capacity for flexibility in approaching problems and decisiveness in taking 
actions. On a similar theme, while continuity between preparation and response is necessary, one 
wonders whether 8-to-5 urban civil servants are appropriate leaders for crisis management in 
rural areas. Institutional flexibility and incentives mechanisms in one’s employment history may 
affect the development of human capital traits needed when leadership roles must be assumed in 
crisis.  
4.2.  Communications and Demographic Differences 
Much has been written about communication in security crises, as cited in Sorensen (2004) 
and elsewhere. Issues somewhat distinct to agriculture do merit attention, however. Modes of 
communication differ across developed world rural and urban areas, more so in the developing 
world. This is not always to the disadvantage of rural areas. Rural communities tend to be more 
stable and homogeneous, so that contact is more likely. Another issue is the demographic trend 
against farm employment in rural areas, especially when within commuting distance of a large 
urban area. Agriculture accounted for 12.4% of jobs in non-metro statistical areas of the United 
States in 1976 but only 6.2% in 2004.  
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Table 4 shows that ownership structures are increasingly concentrated.2 Poultry and feedlot 
beef production have long been large-scale, while this is now true of hog and dairy production. 
Hog operations with over 10,000 animals now account for half of US output but less than 1% of 
all producers. Of 938 million farmland acres in 2002, 353 million were rented or leased. In Iowa, 
20% of farmland is owned by someone not living in the state while 46% of Iowa farmland was 
operator-owned in 2002 (Duffy et al., 2003). Isolation is a primary reason rural America has had 
methamphetamine production problems in recent years. In addition, environmental problems are 
changing how farming and non-farming neighbors view each other and will perhaps decrease 
tolerance for inconveniences that will arise in attempts to control a disease outbreak.  
4.3.  Information Systems and Animal Identification 
Response to infectious disease is a classic case of a public good, and a role for government 
cannot be disputed. Recent disruptive animal disease events have convinced many in developed 
world animal agriculture industries of the pressing need for better animal tracing capacity. This 
capacity should be as far-reaching as is practicable and should certainly include premises 
registration. EU regulation 820/97 requires identification and tracing capabilities for EU bovines 
and bovine products. EU countries share movement information, and many EU countries have 
developed GIS systems to use this information (Kroschewski et al., 2006).  
The United States has responded by seeking to institute a voluntary National Animal 
Identification System (NAIS) involving premises registration, animal identification, and tracing 
capacity. Whether the NAIS that emerges is well-coordinated must be a concern. Diverse 
databases may require costly human intervention during a crisis. By contrast with the EU, where 
commodity tracing has been mandated, the US has less leverage with animal producers. This is 
because the US animal agriculture sector has received very little in the way of direct subsidies 
that can be made conditional on farm-level actions. In addition, producers tend to be less 
accepting of government intrusion. Even so, some producer organizations have been very 
supportive of premises registration. Private sector identification systems are also expanding 
because of increasing demand for product and source verification and because of growth in 
contract agriculture. The US sheep sector already has a template identification system in place. 
                                                 
2 Rushton and Upton (2006) provide other details on rural demography and animal sector 
structure as they relate to biological emergencies. 
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This arose from mandatory federal regulations to identify breeding animals for the National 
Scrapie Eradication Program, which commenced in 2001.  
4.4.  Preparation for Response 
Perhaps the most important issue concerning preparedness for an animal-related biosecurity 
failure is where veterinary personnel would come from. The US veterinary medicine profession 
is increasingly non-agricultural, with fewer than 10,000 private practitioners significantly 
involved in animal agriculture (National Academies, 2005). Animal sector intensification and the 
declining real dollar value of animals have been responsible for reduced farm demand for 
veterinary services. These trends are likely to continue, although perhaps modified by the rise in 
organic and other alternative farming models. Veterinary services at larger farms increasingly 
deal with herd health. Industrial-format production simplifies preparation for response because 
identifying and processing the majority of animals will be easier. Nonetheless, the declining 
stock of veterinary professionals serving agriculture should be a concern. As for the larger 
picture, transparency and accountability can motivate those involved in making contingency 
plans and those who appoint them. Open discourse, a free press, democracy, and an educated 
electorate play a role in setting incentives for preparation.  
 
5.  Prevention 
Prevention involves making resource allocation choices about low probability risks that may 
materialize in the indefinite future. We are not particularly good at making such decisions, 
tending to overemphasize some risks, underemphasize other risks, and place too much weight on 
the recent past (Thaler, 1992). These failings are systematic, applying just as well in the 
collective (i.e., for government decisions) as in the individual. Leaving aside concerns about 
deciding what to do, what follows comments on four aspects of implementing prevention 
strategies of particular relevance to agricultural biosecurity. 
5.1.  Communication and Education 
Entry of an exotic infectious disease is most likely at the weakest link, spreading from there. 
If a costly action can be taken by each participant in the industry to reduce entry risk, participants 
can follow one of two strategies. They can fail to act out of the belief that they have little control 
over whether they are affected. Or they can believe that others are likely to do their parts and 
view themselves as the weak link. Then each participant has strong incentives to act. It all 
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depends on what participants think others are doing and thus on the information they have 
available about the behavior of others. Communication is key, and this can occur through animal 
industry groups or through government programs. Some US producer groups (e.g., poultry) have 
been more active in biosecurity outreach than others, perhaps because of perceived risk. Given 
their educational outreach mission, land grant universities are appropriate places to look for 
organized outreach. A cursory scan of the Internet, together with informal discussions, suggests 
that the extent to which veterinary medicine extension personnel in the United States are 
coordinating in providing biosecurity materials could be improved upon. Two questions are, is 
there a centralized biosecurity Web site that aggregates worthy outreach materials, and have 
these personnel convened to discuss how they could assist in the event of a failure in biosecurity? 
5.2.  Labor 
Concerns about agricultural labor should go beyond the heavy presence of immigrants with 
little attachment to a community. While public data on migrant and undocumented labor in US 
agriculture are scant (Hanson, 2006), migrant employees typically originate from rural areas and 
may return there when on holidays. Labor from Mexico and Central America do not presently 
pose threats from FMD, but any trend toward more immigration from countries further south in 
Latin America should be a concern to the United States. Linguistic, cultural, and educational 
gaps may leave an employer unsure as to the extent of biosecurity risk an employee poses. 
Unlike crop production, animal production has become non-seasonal with the ability to retain 
permanent employees. However, uncertain tenure due to legal status may impede the ability of 
employers to secure a stable, reliable, trained workforce. Legal status matters because, for 
whatever reason, employers and illegal employees will be wary of government contact.  
5.3.  Scale, Vertical Integration, and Transportation 
Within a country, industries may be structured in part to internalize incentives failures 
regarding disease transmission.3 Cattle production has lagged behind pig and poultry production 
in biosecurity measures taken. Cattle farms throughout much of the world also tend to be less 
integrated than large-scale pig and poultry operations. This may be, in part, due to older age at 
slaughter, changing dietary needs during grow-out, and use of surplus dairy calves. Transfer 
through sales auctions of young animals, rather than by contract or ownership from suckler herd 
to finish, often predominates. Imperfect downstream information on treatment history then 
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rationalizes private upstream decisions to avoid biosecurity costs. Biosecurity problems will be 
less severe if farms have reliable knowledge about the source of their animals.  
Tables 5 and 6 show that there are growing internal and international shipments of live 
animals. Public data on trading and movements activities within the US are sparse. Whether the 
extent of trading should be a worry depends very much on how these animals are traded and 
subsequently managed. Evidence suggests that larger feedlots tend to be more careful about the 
animals they buy and to have better biosecurity programs in place for introduced animals, thus at 
least partly offsetting their greater level of exposure.  
Table 7 provides circumstantial evidence for evaluation of performance across farms at 
different scale levels in US dairying. Productivity differentials are marked for both output level 
and input use efficiency. Organic (both small-scale and large-scale) and other production formats 
are growing and promise to be relevant components of animal production in the future. However, 
cost data suggest that industrial format production will continue to expand absent regulatory 
intervention. In many low-income countries, large animal farms are likely to emerge soon. The 
trend toward scale has come with a closing off of animal production systems. Accompanying 
features are emphasis on control, more formal information and information management, as well 
as more automation. Many biosecurity investments involve scale economies, be they capital 
investments or through specialized labor. To illustrate, consider a perimeter fence around a 
square production facility for which the fence costs $10/meter. With one animal per square 
meter, the cost per animal is $40 for one animal but it is $0.4 for 10,000 animals.  
Agricultural structure is an emotive topic, and care is required if objectivity is to be retained. 
The debate on biosecurity and production structure needs to be considered on its own merits 
before including this dimension in the larger picture. Vertical integration (i.e., integrating from 
farm to fork) often does entail transportation during an animal’s growth. But many economies 
from vertical integration are due to a rationalized supply chain that involves fewer relocations, 
fewer trips to sales barns, and more closely monitored transportation. The higher-performing 
animals that typically exist on integrated farms may be more vulnerable to immune system 
shocks. Horizontal integration (i.e., larger feedlots) does involve larger losses if a risk 
materializes but also greater care that the loss does not materialize. Larger farms should also be 
easier to integrate into an emergency preparation and response system, perhaps with Internet 
                                                                                                                                                             
3 See Hennessy, Roosen, and Jensen (2005) on this point. 
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connections. There is a dearth of research on how production structure and behavioral response 
to this structure affect biosecurity risks. 
5.4.  Zoning and Other Land Policies 
Land use externalities have long been recognized in land zoning policy formation. The 
provision of services to residential, commercial, industrial, and agricultural properties is cheapest 
when similar properties are clustered. Safety and nuisance externalities are minimized when 
space separates dissimilar properties. Spatial woodland policy often emphasizes variety, wildlife, 
and firebreaks. Proximity contributes to disease spread, and congested hog production was 
considered to be a factor in Taiwan’s FMD outbreaks a decade ago (Huang, 2000). The mixing 
of species, pigs and poultry or fish species, for example, and use of communal land for grazing 
are also known to feature in the introduction and spread of a disease. The appropriate role for 
government in managing these externalities depends not only on the nature of the most likely 
infections but also on the effectiveness of veterinary health infrastructure, incentives facing 
producers, and actions available to producers.  
 
6.  Policy Alternatives 
The following is a set of tongue-in-cheek policy alternatives. They are loosely sequenced by 
theme but are otherwise not ordered, and no firm sense of the dollar equivalent merits of these 
alternatives is provided. Omitted are any suggestions concerning the design of infrastructure 
because I am far from fully apprised on how elaborate prevention and control systems are meant 
to work in the United States or elsewhere.  
1. Further subsidize activities intended to reduce the prevalence of worrisome infectious 
animal and plant diseases in poorer near-abroad countries. Developed country governments are 
involved in such activities through diverse channels, but the task of assessing donor country 
benefits from such international transfers is difficult. Among the challenges are data limitations, 
the breadth of consequences a disease can have, scientific uncertainty, and uncertainty about the 
efficacy of local institutions. The magnitude of gaps between performance indicators in poor and 
wealthy countries implies high expected social returns on such investments. One endeavor that 
the OIE was contemplating, as of August 28, 2006, was a Global Emergency Response Fund for 
Animal Epizootics and Zoonoses (GERFAE). Countries would be provided with funds to (i) 
compensate livestock owners who report suspicious cases of livestock disease, and (ii) cover 
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direct government costs of controlling an outbreak. If not already being addressed by some other 
mechanism, this seems like a need that should be promptly addressed within a carefully designed 
mechanism. The incentives put in place should encourage mainly cases of true concern to be 
brought forward. Also, education will determine the effectiveness of these efforts because 
growers need to be aware of compensation and have a good sense of what to look for. 
2. Increase participation, through subsidies or otherwise, in animal identification and 
tracking systems. The US government acknowledges this need, having funded producer groups 
through grants to encourage enrollment. Many animal producers and processors are also acutely 
aware of the need. Enrollment is not enough, though. A premises registration list needs to be 
updated just as voter registration lists are. The voluntary approach taken in the United States will 
require carrots as the primary approach to premises registration, animal identification, and 
animal tracing. The extent of ultimate coverage and quality of information provided will depend 
on how producers are drawn into the system. Governments could leverage other programs they 
operate. Possible opportunities to expand participation are discussed in other points on this list. 
As of March 12, 2007, an estimated 25.8% of the estimated 1.44 million livestock farms had 
registered with the NAIS. But participation varies markedly across states, for example, 63% in 
Pennsylvania but 8% in neighboring Ohio. A $50 check for re-registering every two years would 
have a maximum annual cost of $35 million (plus administration costs) per year.  
3. Encourage trading other than through sales barns and strengthen animal transportation 
laws. Production animals are moved and traded in order to better utilize feedstuffs and allow for 
specialization in management. These are important functions, and efforts to reduce movement 
should not be taken without careful consideration. Animals are traded by private treaty or 
through livestock markets, which are subject to oversight. They may move long distances while 
not changing ownership, as with pigs farrowed in one state but grown on contract elsewhere. 
Animal welfare considerations are leading many jurisdictions to revisit laws on trading and 
transporting animals.  
The foremost concern in this area, and one well-understood by the US government, is the 
need to have better movement information, including general patterns and specific movements. 
Oversight at livestock marts is cursory on the whole. This is not the fault of local authorities, of 
overseeing veterinarians, or of anyone else; it is just the nature of marts. Respiratory and fecal 
contact across animal lots is almost inevitable, even when great sanitary care is taken. Costly 
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endemic diseases and diseases of direct concern to agro-terrorism prevention can be 
communicated by these means. Mansley et al. (2003) document the role sheep markets played in 
spreading the 2001 FMD outbreak throughout Britain and beyond.  
In many cases, there appear to be problems with incentives alignment when monitoring 
livestock markets. These markets should bear monitoring costs but should not be in a position to 
influence judgments or recommendations. Inspectors should not be paid directly by the sales 
barn. Governments can encourage fewer trades and less risky trading channels through user fees, 
encouraging source verification schemes, or facilitating online markets that avoid channeling 
animals through a physical location.  
4. Seek better coordination of biosecurity outreach. What other producers and processors do 
is important knowledge, as it can alter a producer’s incentives to take action. In many cases, 
information that others are acting to secure the food system should encourage a producer to do 
likewise. This is likely the case when the objective is to keep a disease out of a region. Farming 
operations differ in many ways, including access to information on an operation’s security 
vulnerabilities. Larger operations may have strong incentives for managers to think about 
security issues, if only because they have more to lose. If heavily capital intensive, then these 
investments may remain idle as a disease problem is being resolved. Labor-intensive farming 
operations, often smaller ones, can temporarily lay off workers. Biosecurity investments will 
often have a large fixed-cost component, which larger farms can spread over more units of 
production.  
From the perspective of disease control, smaller, hobby, and alternative agriculture farms 
will likely endure as significant industry components. Providing information to these farms is 
important, if difficult. The US federal government and the land grant university system’s 
provision of materials appear to be quite fragmented, perhaps because few outreach personnel 
specialize in the issue. A centralized Web site that those supplying research and outreach 
materials can send to and diverse organizations can link to would be most useful. 
5. Use existing and/or new regulatory infrastructure to require that feeding operations 
comply with certain biosecurity measures. The US Clean Water Act (CWA) is administered by 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and by individual states. The Act allows for the 
regulation of point-source emissions into waterways. It covers about 15,500 confined animal 
feeding operations (CAFOs), including their emissions of nitrogen, phosphorus, metals, and 
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bacteria. Since 2003, CAFOs have needed a pollutant discharge permit. At a minimum, the 
permit requires capacities for managing several events relevant to biosecurity. These include the 
operation’s approach to handling dead animals, chemicals, manure, and litter. The plan’s 
emphasis is on water and not on biosecurity. 
As with water quality, the government has public good responsibilities for controlling 
existing and exotic infectious animal diseases. Farms have a strong interest in remaining disease-
free, but incentives may be inadequate because farms may not take account of how their actions 
affect other farms. Fencing, access control, quarantine facilities, sanitation equipment, and 
disposal of potentially infectious materials are among best management practices (BMPs) the 
state might seek to encourage. While the CWA would likely not be a suitable point of departure, 
and the EPA may not be the appropriate agency, any federal efforts to encourage biosecurity 
should not be burdensome. Mandatory participation for smaller units may not be practical, even 
if politically feasible.  
6. Provide subsidies for the cost of installing assets that promote on-farm biosecurity. The 
Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) was reauthorized in the 2002 farm bill as a 
voluntary approach to environmental conservation practices by producers. It offers technical 
assistance and cost-share subsidies for adopting environmentally friendly practices, and priorities 
include reducing point source pollution emissions from CAFOs. A similar program to encourage 
biosecurity BMPs should be as practical to implement.  
7. Provide insurance to growers for major disease outbreaks, and use the insurance to 
promote biosecurity BMPs. Economists are often reluctant to encourage intervention in insurance 
markets because such interventions can create or exacerbate moral hazard problems. Put simply, 
if a grower is insured then she may be less inclined to protect the farm against disease entry. 
However, the government may feel obliged to compensate smaller producers in the event of a 
major disease outbreak. This is in part to encourage reporting, but it can also be in response to 
political pressures. In the event of a disease outbreak, and were government compensation not 
provided, many farmers who did take considerable care could face bankruptcy. The disease 
might be very contagious, or their healthy animals might be condemned as a precautionary 
measure. 
The strong possibility that the government would compensate might undermine prospects for 
a viable private insurance market, but it could be nearly impossible for a government to credibly 
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convey that it will not intervene. In addition, insurance markets are much better at insuring 
isolated events (e.g., house fires, auto thefts) rather than systemic events (e.g., floods). Insurance 
companies are very reluctant to insure for poorly understood contingencies that can result in 
widespread losses. So the question then is how the government can leverage its implicit 
commitment. Conveying to all at an early stage that compensation beyond a certain minimum 
level will be given only to those who participate in premises registration and comply with certain 
monitorable biosecurity BMPs may be one way of doing so.  
8. Revisit food irradiation. There is a consensus that food irradiation may affect the 
nutrition content of food but that the treated food is safe to consume. It is permissible to irradiate 
meat, poultry, and some other foods in the United States. Federal regulations require that 
irradiated foods be labeled, and this (together with the unfortunate name) has turned consumers 
off. One wonders the extent to which irradiation could be used to free up resources to better 
secure foods in other ways.  
9. Facilitate the professionalization of biosecurity management as a career. In light of 
demand for personnel in the area, schools of public health have responded by providing 
programs that include biosecurity as a major emphasis. Curricular materials were likely taught in 
other courses, and individuals may already have acquired this breadth of knowledge. However, 
recognition that a common body of knowledge should be relevant to the careers of a significant 
group of people portends more than a convenient packaging of materials. It provides a vision for 
a discipline, just as accountancy and engineering emerged out of the Industrial Revolution.  
Graduates may form networks and societies for career promotion, continuing education, and 
accreditation. Hiring firms are provided with the view that the biosecurity function merits 
specialization. A more coherent and informed demand for technical improvements in the area 
can lead to new products and product adaptations, as well as demand for research. The public 
sector has a role in this in that it will need many biosecurity professionals in coming years. At 
the state level, public universities decide what majors and minors are taught. For the United 
States, where professionalization in this area seems to be underway, perhaps the best way to 
promote the trend is to give separate titles to biosecurity aspects of legislation and regulations so 
that firms see how others view the issue. 
10. Encourage developments in economic epidemiology. A variety of policy topics in recent 
years, including invasive species, have pointed to deficiencies in this area. The world needs a 
 18
deeper stock of epidemiologists with a good sense of economic principles as well as economists 
who are strong in the natural sciences. Perhaps a joint Ph.D program at a school of public health 
could be partly funded by or integrated with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.  
11.   Prepare for a major crop failure. While US corn yield variability appears to have 
declined in recent years, corn production can fluctuate by 30% or more year to year with drought 
or floods. A natural event or biosecurity attack that had a significant effect on crop supplies is 
more likely to seriously disrupt food and animal feed markets than was the case in the recent 
past. This is because newly installed ethanol production plants are likely to have inelastic short-
run demand for feedstock and may outbid livestock producers.  
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Table 1.  Farm-Level Cash Receipts by Commodity in United States, 2005 
 
Commodity Value of Receipts, 
in $ Billion 
% of Total 
Receipts 
Cumulative %  
All commodities 239 100.0  
Livestock and Products 125 52.3  
Crops 114 47.7  
1. Cattle and calves 49.2 20.6 20.6 
2. Dairy products 26.7 11.2 31.8 
3. Broilers 20.9 8.7 40.5 
4. Corn 19.1 8.0 48.5 
5. Soybeans 16.8 7.0 55.6 
6. Greenhouse/nursery 16.2 6.8 62.3 
7. Hogs 15.0 6.3 68.6 
8. Wheat 6.8 2.9 71.5 
9. Cotton 5.8 2.4 73.9 
10. Hay 4.7 2.0 75.9 
11. Chicken eggs 4.0 1.7 77.6 
12. Grapes 3.5 1.4 79.0 
13. Turkeys 3.2 1.3 80.3 
14. Potatoes 2.4 1.0 81.3 
15. Almonds 2.3 1.0 82.3 
16. Tomatoes 2.3 1.0 83.3 
17. Lettuce 2.0 0.8 84.1 
18. Oranges 1.6 0.7 84.8 
19. Apples 1.6 0.7 85.4 
20. Rice 1.6 0.7 86.1 
Source: National Agricultural Statistics Service. 
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Table 2.  United States Agricultural Exports in  
                $ Billion, 2005 
 
Product  
Live Animals 0.6 
Red Meats & Products 4.3 
Poultry Meats & Products 3.0 
Dairy Products 1.7 
Hides & Skins 1.8 
Wheat 4.3 
Rice 1.3 
Corn 4.8 
Soybean 6.3 
Fruits, Nuts, Etc. 6.4 
Vegetables & Products 5.8 
Cotton 4.0 
Total, incl. other Ag. Exp. 63.0 
Source: U.S. Agricultural Trade Update, ERS, USDA, Feb. 13, 2007. 
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Table 3.  Economic Losses that Could Arise in Natural or Terrorism Biosecurity Attack 
Subject Type, 
Ex 
Ability to 
measure 
Comments 
On-farm 
production 
ante Very rough Biosecurity costs may have multiple purposes. Regulatory 
burden highest on small farms. 
 post Very rough Compensation for slaughtered animals is a transfer, where 
true cost is that of raising taxes. If insufficient 
compensation, efficient farmers may exit. Losses if 
disease becomes endemic disease. Loss of genetic 
resources. Resources can be re-allocated to other uses. 
Domestic  ante Very rough Some costs passed on to consumers. 
market post Very rough Some costs passed on to consumers. Producers of other 
foods may gain. Will consumers behave in rational 
manner? 
Int’l 
markets 
ante Very rough Transaction costs at border mean losses from reduced trade 
and technology transfer. 
 post Very rough Resources used for other purposes. 
Government ante Maybe Administration costs. Dead-weight loss of taxation. How 
well does government prioritize risks? Terrorism makes 
prioritization more difficult.  
 post Maybe Administration costs. Dead-weight loss of taxation. Loss of 
credibility. Focus taken from other issues. Bunched 
terrorist attacks increase cost of preparation. 
Mortality  ante Maybe People may avoid foods they believe to be risky. 
& quality of 
life 
post Maybe Can science adequately identify consequences? Who 
decides on loss due to impaired person? 
Food & 
Agri-input  
ante Very rough Biosecurity costs may have multiple purposes. Regulatory 
burden highest on small businesses. 
sectors post Very rough Lost markets, and few alternative uses of resources in 
capital intensive sectors. Low political will to 
compensate? 
Other 
sectors 
ante Very rough Business travel and tourism more expensive, but people do 
other things with resources. 
 post Very rough Local tourism costs can be high. Where do clean-up 
resources, etc., come from? 
LDCs ante Very rough Trade barriers cause lower export prices, higher import 
prices. 
 post Maybe Lower stocks for food relief in famine. 
Individual 
liberty 
ante 
post  
Hard 
Hard 
Where to start? 
Animal 
welfare 
post Maybe Who decides on loss due to dead animal? 
Note: With all ex post losses, one needs to distinguish between assessing loss due to a realized biosecurity 
breakdown and expected ex post losses. Assessing the ex ante probabilities over different realizations of 
physical losses will, in general, be very difficult because of unknowns about the nature of risks and 
vulnerabilities of response infrastructure. 
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Table 4.  Number of Farms in United States, by  
                Enterprise, in thousands 
 
Enterprises engaged in 1974 2002 
Beef Cows 1,025 796 
Dairy Cows 404 92 
Hogs 470 79 
Broilers 34 32 
Grain Corn 883 349 
Wheat 534 170 
Soybeans 542 318 
Source: US Census of Agriculture. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.  Internal (State-to-State) Live Animal Shipments (Million  
                Head and Percentage of Inventory), United States 
 
Itema 1980 2005
Cattle 20.0 (18.0%) 20.8 (21.8%)
Pigs 4.6 (7.1%) 33.4 (54.8%)
Sheep 2.2 (17.3%) 1.5 (24.3%)b
Source: National Agricultural Statistics Service. 
a Percentage of annual inventory data are in parentheses. Cattle inventory percentage is for January 1 inventory of all 
cattle and calves. Pigs inventory percentage is for December 1 inventory of all hogs and pigs. Sheep inventory 
percentage is for January inventory of all sheep and lambs.  
b The 2005 sheep data are for 2004, the last reported year. 
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Table 6.  World-Wide Exports of Live Animals (Million Head) 
 
Item 1981 2004
Cattle 7.3 8.0
Pigs 9.6 22.7
Sheep 15.8 14.8
Chickens 366.2 816.9
Turkeys 14.6 64.0
Source: FAO, Agricultural Data, Agriculture and Food Trade. 
 
 
 
Table 7.  Summary of ARMS 2000 Dairy Survey Data 
 
 Enterprise Size 
Summary statistic, all are averages Medium 
50-99 
Large 
100-499 
Industrial 
≥ 500 
Herd size 88 313 955 
Output/cow (lb/year) 16,157 17,420 17,326 
Labor efficiency (hours/100 lb milk) 0.44 0.19 0.11 
Feed efficiency(lb. feed/ 100 lb milk) 252 317 162 
Veterinary expenses ($/100 lb milk) 0.71 0.58 0.60 
Note: Data are as reported in tables 4 and 5 of Short (2004). 
